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BACKGROUND:  Effective agricultural and 
food security policies in Africa need to be based 
on a solid empirical foundation.  Over the past 
decade, the maize sectors of eastern and southern 
Africa have undergone major changes:  market 
reform and structural adjustment, an apparent shift 
in cropped area from maize to cassava and other 
crops, rapid growth in urban populations and the 
demand for food, and political instability in parts 
of the region.   
 
However, there has been little effort to understand 
how these changes have affected trends in maize 
supply and demand conditions, secular price 
trends, and their implications for food policy in 
the region.  If the region is indeed moving toward 
structural deficit, it would be expected that the 
price surface in the region should be moving 
upward toward import parity.  This would have 
major implications for food security policy in the 
region.  
 
OBJECTIVES: This note summarizes analysis
1 
of trends in net maize exports over the 1960-2005  
period and examines whether these trends are 
being reflected in changing maize price levels in 
the region. We then highlight the implications of 
the findings for countries’ agricultural 
development strategies.  
 
DATA AND METHODS: Data on maize and 
maize meal imports and exports are obtained from 
the FAOSTAT online database. Monthly 
wholesale grain prices and retail meal prices in 
Zambia, Mozambique and Kenya were obtained 
from the Ministries of Agriculture and national 
statistical services in each country. South Africa’s 
maize grain and maize meal price data was 
obtained from the South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) and Maize Board annual 
reports compiled by the Statistical Service of 
South Africa. All prices are deflated using real 
exchange rates.  
 
Main Findings: 
•  Both the eastern and southern Africa regions are moving towards structural maize deficit.  
•  Despite the region’s increasing importation of maize, maize grain prices in most of the region have 
relatively remained constant over the past decade and are actually trending downward in South 
Africa.  Retail maize meal prices are trending downward in Zambia and Kenya, thanks to greater 
competition at the milling and retailing end of the maize value chain.  
•  In most countries of the region, maize market performance since the 1990s reflects not the impacts 
of “liberalized markets” but rather the mixed policy environment of legalized private trade within 
the context of continued strong government operations in food markets. 
•  Rising maize imports is not necessarily bad as long as small farmers can be encouraged to diversify 
successfully into higher-return crops and off-farm activities.  Governments and donors can support 
this process through public goods investments, greater stability in the policy environment, and 
supporting commercial investment in market development.Net exports are the difference between total 
exports and imports of maize grain and meal.   
Although FAO trade data do not capture 
unrecorded trade flows between countries, the net 
impact on regional net exports is zero, since each 
bag of unrecorded cross-border exports from one 
country in the region is imported by another 
country in the region.  For the purposes of this 
paper, the southern Africa region consists of 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Malawi.  East Africa includes Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and Ethiopia.  
 
We regressed regional and country-specific net 
export data on linear time trends, and on models 
allowing for shifts in the slope of the trend 
between the 1960-1981 and 1982-2005 periods.  
 
FINDINGS:  First, both the southern and east 
Africa regions are moving towards structural 
maize deficit.  Net exports regressed on a linear 
time trend in both regions show statistically 
significant downward slopes. Net maize (grain 
plus meal) exports in the southern Africa region 
declined at a rate of -72,201 metric tons per year 
for the period 1960-2005.  Net maize exports over 
the same period in east Africa declined at the rate 
of -9,798 metric tons per year.   There is no 
significant difference in the trend in net exports in 
eastern Africa between 1960-1981 and 1982-
2005. In southern Africa, the net export trends in 
the two periods are statistically different. Net 
exports in southern Africa increased by 85,544 
metric tons per year for the period 1960-1980 and 
then declined by 94,586  metric tons per year 
during the period 1981-2005.   
At the country-level, there was a downward trend 
in net maize exports in all countries of southern 
Africa, with all of these being statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  In east Africa, there 
was a significant downward trend in net maize 
exports for 2 of 6 of the east African countries 
(Kenya and Rwanda), while for Ethiopia the trend 
is positive and significant.  The trend is weakly 
negative in Tanzania and weakly positive in DRC. 
Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe, all net exporters 
of maize in the 1970s and 1980s, are now chronic 
importers. The reduction of maize production 
subsidies in South Africa has also reduced the 
exportable surplus in that country, although it 
remains a reliable exporter.  
 
Second, in recent years, and especially after the 
inception of political turmoil in Zimbabwe in 
the late 1990s, South Africa has become the 
only reliable exporter of white maize in the 
region.  Areas of Mozambique, Zambia, and 
Malawi typically produce maize surpluses, but 
these surpluses are usually depleted halfway 
through the marketing year.  Urban and rural 
maize deficit regions have become increasingly 
dependent on South Africa for their residual 
national white maize requirements.   
 
Third, despite the fact that the region is 
becoming more maize deficit, wholesale maize 
grain prices in Zambia, Kenya, Mozambique 
and Malawi have relatively remained constant 
over the past decade and are actually trending 
downward in South Africa.  However, retail 
maize meal prices are trending downwards in 
Zambia and Kenya, whilst trending upwards in 
South Africa and Mozambique (figure 2A-E).   
 
 
Figure 1:  Net exports of maize grain and maize meal in east and southern Africa 
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How can consumers in Zambia and Kenya be 
experiencing declining maize meal prices during a 
period when net maize imports are rising?  
 
The maize market reforms of the 1990s have 
played an important role in this apparent paradox.  
Prior to liberalization, a few officially registered 
maize-processing firms had a de facto oligopoly 
on milling maize and supplying the retail sector. 
Regulations made it difficult for non-registered 
millers and traders to transport grain into urban 
areas or acquire grain from the marketing board. 
Market reform opened this system to greater 
competition as small millers and retailers who 
were previously excluded from entering the 
market were now allowed to procure and transport 
grain freely across district boundaries.  
 
The marketing reforms induced rapid investment 
in medium- and small-scale milling and retailing 
networks.  In response to greater competition, the 
registered large milling companies cut their prices 
in an attempt to regain lost market share.   
Increased competition at the milling and retailing 
stage of the maize value chain has greatly 
benefited low-income consumers in countries such 
as Kenya and Zambia.  
 
By contrast, maize meal prices have risen over 
time in urban areas of South Africa and southern 
Mozambique.  The structure and behavior of the 
grain marketing systems in these urban areas is 
such that grain is often not readily available to 
support a thriving small-scale milling and trading 
system which could otherwise exert competitive 
 
 
Figure 2a-e: Trends in wholesale maize grain and retail meal prices (retail maize grain prices). 
 
Linear trend(meal): -0.655***
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[A] Lusaka-Zambia: Price trends
 
Linear trend(meal): 0.361**
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[B] Randfontein- South Africa: Price trends
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Linear trend(meal): 0.693***
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[C] Maputo-Mozambique: Price trends
 
Linear trend(meal): -0.572***
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Page 4 pressures on the large-scale milling and retailing 
industries in these countries, as has occurred in 
Kenya and Zambia.  A major priority in 
Mozambique, South Africa, and potentially other 
countries in the region is to restructure 
government marketing and trade policies so that 
grain remains available for purchase by small 
traders to transport and sell grain to households in 
rural as well as urban areas, many of who may 
want to acquire services of small custom millers 
to convert the grain for final consumption. 
 
However, wholesale grain prices have not risen 
for small farmers and they remain highly variable.  
Our analysis indicates that this is primarily due to 
the lack of public goods investments to reduce the 
very high marketing costs facing traders operating 
in remote rural areas, a highly unstable and 
increasingly politicized grain marketing policy 
environment, and consequently, muted private 
sector investment in rural assembly, long-distance 
wholesaling, and storage in response to 
liberalization. 
 
There is widespread agreement that the food 
marketing policy environment over the past 
decade has not effectively supported agricultural 
productivity growth for the millions of small 
farmers in the region. Many governments remain 
important players in their maize markets, both 
through their direct procurement and sale 
operations and through their use of discretionary 
trade policy instruments.  Though the quantities 
they trade are smaller than during the controlled 
market era, marketing boards in Kenya, Malawi, 
and Zambia still exert a major presence in the 
maize markets, handling between 20 to 50 percent 
of marketed volumes.  Many countries in the 
region continue to implement food price 
stabilization programs of various types. However 
government actions in the maize market have 
become increasingly reactive and short-term in 
nature, subject to unannounced policy changes 
that create major risks for private investment. 
efforts (e.g., Nijhoff et al, 2003; Rubey, 2004) 
These countries’ market performance since the 
1990s reflects not the impacts of unfettered 
market forces but rather the mixed policy 
environment of legalized private trade within the 
context of continued strong government 
operations in food markets.  
 
Fourth, the difference between wholesale maize 
grain prices in Lusaka, Zambia, Maputo, 
Mozambique, Nairobi, Kenya and 
Randfontein, South Africa are trending 
upwards.  Beginning in 2001, maize grain prices 
in all the countries examined here have generally 
moved above the Randfontein South Africa price 
(Figure 3).  Coupled with the region’s movement 
toward structural maize deficits, these findings 
suggest that much of the region is increasingly 
moving toward an import parity pricing situation 
vis a vis South Africa.  However, small farmers’ 
ability to benefit from rising prices in the capital 
cities will be constrained, once again, by poor 
market infrastructure and by uncertain 
government policies that make it risky for trading 
firms to invest in rural assembly, wholesaling, and 
cross-border trade.  
 
Smallholder supply response is also constrained 
by farm structure:  over half of the small farms in 
the region are less than one hectare in size.  One-
quarter of the farms are less than 0.5 hectares in 
size (Jayne et al, 2003). These farms cannot earn a  
decent income through a maize commercialization 
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strategy unless there is tremendous growth in 
maize productivity, which will require sustained 
and dedicated investment in crop science and 
extension.   
 
There is limited potential for area expansion in 
most of the region, especially in the fertile zones. 
Hence, without land redistribution and/or 
substantial maize productivity growth, the gradual 
movement toward smaller farm sizes will compel 
households to adopt more diversified 
commercialization strategies capable of 
maximizing the value of output per scarce unit of  
land.  In highly land-constrained areas, it should 
not be surprising to find households shifting out of 
relatively low-value maize toward horticulture, 
tobacco, cotton, and niche crops, and then using 
the revenue to buy their staple food needs.  Thus, 
the trend toward structural maize deficits is not 
necessarily a bad omen for the region if small 
farmers can shift into other activities that provide 
higher incomes.  There is evidence to suggest that 
this is already happening at least for a sub-set of 
smallholder farmers in the region.  
 
CONCLUSIONS:  Maize will remain a crucial 
part of the region’s food security equation in two 
ways:  first, as a purchased commodity for 
satisfying the food requirements of a more 
diversified rural economy, and second, as a cash 
crop in areas where it is agro-ecologically suited 
to provide high returns.   
 
Rising land constraints will progressively 
encourage farmers to shift toward crops providing 
high returns to scarce land.  Because much of 
Africa is experiencing increased land pressure and 
limited potential for area expansion, population 
growth is causing a decline in land/labor ratios and 
farm sizes are declining.  Maize is a relatively low 
value-to-bulk crop that currently provides high 
returns to fertilizer application and land in a 
limited number of areas (e.g., Kenya’s North Rift, 
parts of Southern and Central Provinces in 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe’s Mashonaland maize 
belt). Given reasonable assumptions about the 
potential for future productivity gains, it is 
unlikely that maize will provide the net revenue on 
the millions of farms that are 0.5-1.0 hectares or 
smaller to generate substantial income growth, 
especially in the semi-arid areas. 
 
Therefore, the finding highlighted in this note – 
that the eastern and southern Africa regions are 
moving into a structural maize deficit situation – 
may be a logical consequence of population 
growth, land pressure, and diversification into 
other crops.  Yet maize productivity growth will 
remain a crucial objective.  If it can be achieved, it 
will reduce import dependence and remain a 
source of dynamism and growth for many small 
farmers in the region.  But broad-based 
improvements in rural livelihoods and incomes 
will require productivity growth for other crops:  
oilseed crops, horticulture, animal products, and 
other food crops such as cassava.   
 
Research evidence from southern Africa as well as 
around the world indicates that the greatest 
contribution that public sector resources can make 
to sustained agricultural growth and poverty 
reduction is from sustained investment in crop 
science, effective extension programs, physical 
infrastructure, and a stable and supportive 
marketing policy environment for a range of crops 
that provide income growth opportunities for 
smallholders in a range of different agro-
ecological environments. Toward this end, greater 
transparency and coordination between private and 
public market actors in agricultural markets can 
promote the achievement of food price stability, 
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